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INTRODUCTION:
PERSPECTIVES ON
IMMIGRATION REFORM
Kathleen Kim*
The United States is home to almost 40 million immigrants,
representing more than 20 percent of the world’s entire migrant
population.1 Economic opportunity, religious freedom, and civil and
political rights have attracted foreign nationals to the United States
for decades. Our country has benefited from this long history of
immigration, which has sustained and advanced our economic
productivity and increased the vibrancy of our diverse society.
Recent federal governmental policies, however, have had a
diluting effect on the positive impact of immigration. Concerns about
terrorism and unauthorized migration have fueled stricter
enforcement practices at the border and in the interior. Since 2004,
the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) budget grew from $6 billion to
$10.1 billion to support a doubling in the number of border patrol
agents as well as state of the art virtual fencing and surveillance
technology.2 According to some commentators, the militaristic
approach to border enforcement has fueled anti-immigrant hostility,
violence, and migrant deaths.3 Yet, government officials regard their
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School Los Angeles. I am grateful to the wonderful
editorial staff and authors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review’s Developments in the Law
issue, and thank you to my excellent research assistants, Shelly Yoo and Andrea Sitar.
1. PHILIP MARTIN & ELIZABETH MIDGLEY, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU,
POPULATION BULLETIN UPDATE: IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA 2010, at 1 (2010), available at
http://www.prb.org/pdf10/immigration-update2010.pdf.
2. AARTI KOHLI & DEEPA VARMA, BORDERS, JAILS, AND JOBSITES: AN OVERVIEW OF
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. 6 (2011), available at http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/WI_Enforcement_Paper_final_web%282%29.pdf; U.S. Customs &
Border Prot., Securing America’s Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/
cbp_overview/fy2010_factsheet.xml.
3. See, e.g., Peter Andreas, The Transformation of Migrant Smuggling Across the U.S.Mexican Border, in GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 107, 112–16
(David Kyle & Rey Koslowski eds., 2001) (remarking on the negative impact of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 and subsequent acts); WAYNE A. CORNELIUS, IMPACTS OF
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border enforcement efforts a success, noting a significant reduction
in border arrests to indicate fewer unauthorized crossings.4
Beyond
the
border,
Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement (ICE) continues to aggressively remove unlawfully
present individuals and “criminal aliens.” Utilizing local law
enforcement through programs such as 287(g)5 and Secure
Communities,6 ICE purports to prioritize the removal of immigrants
who have committed dangerous crimes.7 But, investigations of these
programs reveal that predominantly noncriminal undocumented
immigrants and immigrants with nonserious violations have been
targeted8 and that in implementing these programs, racial profiling9
BORDER ENFORCEMENT ON UNAUTHORIZED MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
(2006), available at http://www.bibdaily.com/pdfs/Cornelius%20testimony%208-2-06.pdf
(recognizing that physical border-defense mechanisms constitute the only legislative reform
measures that Congress has agreed on and enacted); Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling
‘Unwanted’ Immigration: Lessons From the United States, 1993–2004, 31 J. ETHNIC &
MIGRATION STUD. 775, 776 (2005) (describing the U.S. immigration-control strategy as launched
by President Clinton and continued through the presidency of George W. Bush); Bill Ong Hing,
The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 121, 127–28 (2001)
(outlining Operation Gatekeeper’s emphasis on deterrence of unauthorized migration).
4. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., supra note 2.
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/287g/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2011) (describing the statute previously known as
287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which gives state or
local law enforcement delegated authority for immigration enforcement within their
jurisdictions).
6. Tanya Pérez-Brennan, Illinois Drops Secure Communities as Fierce Opposition Mounts
in Massachusetts, Other States, FOX NEWS LATINO (May 5, 2011), http://latino.foxnews.com/
latino/politics/2011/05/05/illinois-drops-secure-communities-fierce-opposition-mountsmassachussetts/ (illustrating the trend of states, including Massachusetts, that are beginning to
withdraw from participating in the federal program that opponents believe is part of an antiimmigration trend); Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2011) (describing the program
that fingerprints those arrested and booked, and checks them against FBI criminal history records
and DHS immigration records; ICE then determines if immigration enforcement action is
required, considering the arrestee’s immigration status and criminal history as well as the severity
of the crime).
7. Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement and State Identification Bureau, available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2011)
(template of agreement to create secure communities).
8. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13
(2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf
(stating that the majority of individuals identified by 287(g) and the Criminal Alien Program
(CAP) were “non-criminal aliens”—immigrants not convicted of crimes—65 percent for 287(g)
and 57 percent for CAP); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES IDENT/IAFIS INOPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS
THROUGH APR. 30, 2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-
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and other civil rights violations have taken place.10 Raids and audits
of workplaces have also contributed to significant removals of
noncriminal noncitizens, while they have failed to hold some
unscrupulous employers accountable for the labor abuses that may
have taken place there.11
In total, ICE removed 358,886 individuals in 2008, up from
189,026 in 2001.12 The number of removals for 2010 was a recordstats/nationwide_
interoperability_stats-fy2011-feb28.pdf (detailing that from 2008 until now, 84 percent of all
Alien IDENT matches resulted in the identification of an alien charged with an L2 or L3 lesser
crime, which includes traffic and immigration status violations, while only 16 percent were
charged with or convicted of an L1 serious crime).
9. AARTI SHAHANI & JUDITH GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, LOCAL DEMOCRACY ON
ICE: WHY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO BUSINESS IN FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (2009), available at http://www.justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/JSDemocracy-On-Ice.pdf (asserting that race, not crime, propelled 287(g) growth; for example,
61 percent of targeted regions had violent and property crimes lower than the national average,
87 percent of regions targeted had Latino populations higher than the national average, and
regions heavily impacted by “criminal illegal alien” activity were not prioritized); DEBORAH M.
WEISSMAN ET AL., THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS:
287(G) PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA 29 (2009), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/
documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf (pointing out that 287(g) encourages racial
profiling, with Hispanics being disproportionately targeted for minor traffic offenses for the
purpose of deportation); The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States, AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 29, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/human-rights_racial-justice/
persistence-racial-and-ethnic-profiling-united-states (explaining that racial minorities continue to
be unfairly victimized when authorities investigate, stop, frisk, or search individuals based upon
subjective identity-based characteristics rather than on identifiable evidence of illegal activity;
victims continue to be racially or ethnically profiled while they work, drive, shop, pray, travel,
and stand on the street).
10. AFTON BRANCHE, DRUM MAJOR INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE COST OF FAILURE: THE
BURDEN OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN AMERICA’S CITIES 18 (2011), available at
http://www.drummajorinstitute.org/pdfs/DMI_Cost_of_Failure.pdf (“[I]mmigrants who are
merely arrested on the suspicion of having committed a crime can be identified and deported,
regardless of their guilt or innocence.”); Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and
the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 139–44 (2008)
(describing detention of non-citizens that can last for months and years without appointed
counsel, leading to their loss of liberty and an impairment of their ability to prepare a defense to
removal); Bridget Kessler, Comment, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No Problem? A Closer
Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 571, 591 (2009) (examining the ambiguous
language of custody procedures regulation that allows DHS to detain individuals for extended
periods of time without justification).
11. Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for
Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247 (2009)
(exploring the subversion of civil rights imperatives when immigration enforcement authorities
detain and deport undocumented workers who may have experienced workplace exploitation).
12. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_2009.pdf.
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breaking 392,862.13 All the while, backlogs for family- and
employment-based immigration applications persist, resulting in
processing delays of more than a decade under some circumstances.14
Numerical limitations on annual visa issuances exacerbate these
lengthy waits; an estimated 5.8 million individuals approved for
family-based immigrant visas are still waiting to receive them.15
Meanwhile, anti-immigrant state laws, such as Arizona’s
SB 1070,16 complicate efforts toward a fairer and more efficient
immigration system by enacting nonuniform standards for
immigration-related crimes and mandating inadequately trained state
law enforcement officers to act as immigration enforcers. Seven
lawsuits, including one from the U.S. Department of Justice,17 assert
that SB 1070 unconstitutionally regulates immigration matters,
violating longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence that establishes
the federal government’s exclusive authority over immigration.18
Even after two federal courts ruled significant provisions of the law

13. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE
TOTAL REMOVALS 1 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroremovals.pdf.
14. NAT’L VISA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF IMMIGRANT VISA
APPLICANTS IN THE FAMILY-SPONSORED AND EMPLOYMENT-BASED PREFERENCES REGISTERED
AT THE NATIONAL VISA CENTER 2 (2010), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/
WaitingListItem.pdf (indicating that as of October 2010, 4,683,393 family-sponsored and
employment-based visa applications were still wait-listed).
15. Reuniting Families Act, CONGRESSMAN MIKE HONDA, http://honda.house.gov/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90&Itemid=76 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011)
(“There are currently 5.8 million people in the family immigration backlog waiting
unconscionable periods of time to reunite with their family members.”).
16. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
17. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011); Order, Escobar v. Brewer, No.
4:10-cv-00249 (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2010); Judgment of Dismissal in a Civil Case, Frisancho v.
Brewer, No. 2:10-cv-00926 (D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2010); Complaint, League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Arizona, No. 2:10-cv-1453 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2010); Complaint, Friendly House v.
Whiting, No. 2:10-cv-1061 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2010); Complaint, Nat’l Coal. of Latino Clergy &
Christian Leaders v. Arizona, No. 2:10-cv-00943 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010); Complaint, Salgado v.
Brewer, No. 2:10-cv-00951 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010).
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress has the power to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization.); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889) (declaring that the government has the power to exclude aliens who
possess characteristics that Congress forbids, and the power must be exercised to maintain its
independence). But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (holding that Congress’s
plenary power to create immigration law is subject to important constitutional limitations); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983) (recognizing that although Congress has plenary authority,
that authority must not offend other constitutional restrictions and be exercised in a
constitutionally permissible manner).
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unconstitutional,19 other states continue to enact similarly punitive
laws.20
What has culminated is a deeply emotional and polarized public
debate over the rights of immigrants. On one side of the debate,
immigration restrictionists favor tougher enforcement measures and
may feel that the federal government is not doing enough to keep out
newcomers and to remove those here unlawfully. On the other side,
immigration liberals argue for less enforcement and additional
pathways to legal resident status in the United States. Both seem to
agree that the current immigration system is in a state of disrepair
and in desperate need of reform.21
President Obama has responded by pledging to make
immigration reform a top priority. The administration’s official
platform promotes safe, orderly, and legal migration that protects
human rights, asylees, and human trafficking victims and the
integration of legal immigrants, while it opposes unregulated and
unauthorized migration.22 Yet, some commentators have observed
that the administration’s current on-the-ground approach to
immigration reflects an “enforcement now, enforcement forever”
policy without any signs for meaningful reform.23 Nonetheless,
19. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339.
20. Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, H.B. 497, 2001 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011); Julia
Preston, Immigrants Are Focus of Harsh Bill in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2011, at A10
(comparing the Alabama immigration bill with Arizona’s SB 1070 and noting that Alabama takes
immigration enforcement further by, among other things, disallowing illegal immigrant students
from attending public colleges, obligating public schools to determine the immigration status of
their students, and making it a crime for undocumented workers to apply for work); Court Blocks
Implementation of Utah “Show Me Your Papers Law”, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 10,
2011), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/court-blocks-implementation-utah-show-me-yourpapers-law (describing the actions of a federal district court in Salt Lake City that blocked
implementation of HB 497).
21. N.Y. TIMES & CBS NEWS, POLL: APR. 28–MAY 2, 2010, at 7 (2010), available at
http://documents.nytimes.com/new-york-timescbs-news-poll-immigration-overhaul (stating that
89 percent of Americans from both sides of the immigration issue think that fundamental reform
is necessary).
22. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 3 (May 2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf
(describing the Obama administration’s goals for immigration reform with a focus on border
security, accountability for businesses that exploit undocumented workers, family unification,
encouragement of highly trained and educated immigrants to stay and develop industries, and
accountability for those currently living in the United States illegally before they are allowed to
be eligible for citizenship).
23. See Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273,
297–98 (2010) (criticizing Obama for continuing to enforce the harsh Bush-era policies, such as
employer sanctions and criminal charges of entry without inspection, rather than focusing on
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President Obama has publicly called for congressional action and
some members of the legislature have introduced comprehensive
immigration reform bills.24 It is therefore imperative for stakeholders
to weigh in on the discussion to ensure that any immigration reform
measure will accurately reflect the values of our society’s changing
demographic, while it adheres to our country’s tradition of
democracy, equality, and due process for all.25
This special law review issue shares the perspectives of five
student authors who critically examine and attempt to resolve the
perplexing legal and normative dilemmas that key aspects of
immigration reform present. Each author has focused on a subtopic
within a major component of immigration reform: legal immigration,
border enforcement, interior enforcement, immigration detention,
and immigration courts.26
We begin with the category of legal immigration, which
includes both family-based and employment-based visas. To fulfill
the policy objective of family unification, U.S. immigration laws
permit some foreign nationals to legally immigrate to the United
States through certain familial relationships. U.S. labor demands also
provide the underlying rationale for employment-based immigration,
permitted when an employer, who is unable to find a citizen
employee and also meets other criteria, sponsors an immigrant
reforming the broken immigration system); Kevin R. Johnson, Obama on Immigration:
Enforcement Now, Enforcement Forever?, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Aug. 2, 2009),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2009/08/obama-on-immigration-enforcementnow-enforcement-forever.html (highlighting protestors who demand a moratorium on the
enforcement of Obama’s immigration policy, which has been more pervasive and devastating
than practices executed under President Bush); see also Marcello Ballve, Immigrant Advocates
Say Immigration Enforcement Worse Under Obama, ALTERNET (Mar. 8, 2010),
http://www.alternet.org/story/145963/immigrant_advocates_say_immigration_enforcement_wors
e_under_obama (noting immigrant advocates’ criticism of Obama’s immigration enforcement
practices).
24. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010, S. 3932.IS, 111th Cong. (2010),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s3932is/pdf/BILLS-111s3932is.pdf;
Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America’s Security and Prosperity of 2009, HR 4321.
111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4321ih/pdf/BILLS111hr4321ih.pdf.
25. MANUEL PASTOR & RHONDA ORTIZ, IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN LOS ANGELES:
STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR FUNDERS 1–3 (Jan. 2009), available at http://csii.usc.edu/
documents/immigrant_integration.pdf (listing the demographics of immigrants in Los Angeles,
where more than one-third of the population is foreign-born, nearly half of the workforce is
composed of immigrants, and one million of the nation’s undocumented immigrants reside).
26. Other areas within the rubric of “comprehensive immigration reform,” such as
legalization programs, are outside the scope of this issue.
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employee.27 Yet, dysfunction in the legal immigration system and
low caps on visa numbers28 have left those who have legal
authorization to enter our country in a limbo status, sometimes
waiting to immigrate for years.29
Others, even those married to U.S. citizens, will never have a
legal avenue of entry under the discriminatory peculiarities of current
laws, which deny immigration equality to same-sex partners. Jay
Strozdas addresses this particularly harsh reality of family-based
immigration in his article, Trendlines: Court Decisions, Proposed
Legislation, and Their Likely Impact on Binational Same-Sex
Families. Because spousal immigration sponsorship for foreign
partners depends on the federal government’s definition of marriage
through the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines
marriage as a legal union between a man and a woman,30 same-sex
binational couples are excluded from laws that enable citizens to
sponsor their foreign spouses to immigrate.31 As a consequence,
Strozdas explains that thousands of same-sex couples are forced to
live together in exile or separate. Shedding new light on this
unsettling aspect of immigration, Strozdas draws from contemporary
jurisprudence on marriage equality to advance promising reforms of
the family immigration system that would rectify this inequity.
Specifically, Strozdas examines three areas of recent doctrinal
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); 8 C.F.R § 204.5 (2011).
28. INA § 201(c)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (480,000 baseline for familysponsored visas); INA § 201(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d)(1)(A) (140,000 baseline for
employment-based visas); INA § 201(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(e) (55,000 baseline for diversity visas).
29. Reuniting Families Act, supra note 15.
30. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
31. SCOTT LONG ET AL., FAMILY, UNVALUED: DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE
OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S. LAW (2006), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45db016e2.html (describing current immigration law, which
discriminates against same-sex binational couples); Christopher A. Dueñas, Coming to America:
The Immigration Obstacle Facing Binational Same-Sex Couples, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 813
(2000) (finding that the United States is currently the only industrialized English-speaking
country that does not grant same-sex partners immigration preferences); Adam Francoeur, The
Enemy Within: Constructions of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy and the Homoterrorist Threat,
3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 345, 356 (2007) (illustrating the political landscape where, within days
after the passage of DOMA, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), which strengthened procedures
to remove immigrants from the United States and created a powerful tool for excluding Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) immigrants in the name of protecting and preserving
U.S. values); Cori K. Garland, Say “I Do”: The Judicial Duty to Heighten Constitutional Scrutiny
of Immigration Policies Affecting Same-Sex Binational Couples, 84 IND. L.J. 689, 700–02 (2009)
(explaining that same-sex couples cannot benefit from spousal immigration).
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development: Perry v. Schwarzenegger,32 which examined the
constitutionality of Proposition 8, California’s prohibition of samesex marriage; judicial challenges to DOMA; and the Uniting
American Families Act (UAFA), pending legislation that would
provide immigration benefits to same-sex partners. Strozdas
expounds on the significance of each development, and, in doing so,
he extrapolates various strategies to achieve immigration equality for
same-sex binational couples.
While legal immigration avenues urgently require change, much
of the current rhetoric around immigration policy focuses not on
legal immigration but on preventing and punishing unauthorized
migration. Immigration enforcement begins at the border, the first
point of entry for many migrants, where the government’s strategy in
recent years has concentrated on an increasingly militarized
approach, including high numbers of border guards and virtual
fencing, sometimes resembling a war zone.33 The public has also
responded with its own vigilante-style monitoring: the minutemen.34
Yet, while undocumented border crossing has always been a crime,35
most immigrants caught at the border have traditionally been
deported through civil removal proceedings rather than through
criminal prosecutions.36 Recently, this trend has reversed37 due to
enforcement programs like Operation Streamline, which targets

32. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
33. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
NATIONAL BORDER PATROL STRATEGY (2004), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/
cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/national_bp_strategy.ctt/national_bp_strat
egy.pdf (outlining the strategy and goals for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which
include deterrence of illegal entry through technology, personnel, and improved infrastructure).
34. James Duff Lyall, Vigilante State: Reframing the Minuteman Project in the American
Politics and Culture, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 260–61 (2009) (describing the Minutemen, a
small vigilante group assembled in 2004 that began a private campaign against Latinos and
Latinas by monitoring the border between the United States and Mexico).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006) (outlining penalties for improper entry by alien); id. § 1326
(outlining penalties for reentry of removed aliens).
36. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (recognizing that removal proceedings are
civil, not criminal, and detention of aliens without process is not punishment).
37. Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 135, 135–37 (2009) (noting the increase in migration-related criminal offenses and
immigration-related prosecutions in the past decade); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 469, 475–82 (2007) (discussing the “criminalization” of immigration law and how some
aspects of criminal enforcement are being used in removals, which the Supreme Court has
historically defined as civil proceedings).
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popular entry points and refers all undocumented persons caught
within those districts to the Department of Justice for en masse
criminal prosecution.38 Those charged with unauthorized entry face
jail sentences, deportation, and enhanced penalties if they are caught
reentering the country.39 Supporters of the program claim that it has
effectively deterred unauthorized migration,40 while critics contend
that Operation Streamline has wasted resources and curtailed the due
process rights of border entrants, who are subject to summary
criminal proceedings.41
In her article, Crossing Over: Assessing Operation Streamline
and the Rights of Immigrant Criminal Defendants at the Border,
Edith Nazarian examines the constitutional protection that Operation
Streamline endangers and analyzes the normative implications of
United States v. Roblero-Solis,42 a recent court decision that found
Operation Streamline’s en masse proceedings impermissible under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than on
constitutional grounds.43 While Nazarian agrees with the outcome of
the case, she critiques the court’s rule-based reasoning as an implicit
denial of the core constitutional principles that ought to serve to
effectuate the rights of immigrant criminal defendants. Nazarian
suggests an alternative approach, a theory of territoriality, which
would confer full constitutional rights to noncitizens based on their

38. JOANNA LYDGATE, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE
(2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf.
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Janet Napolitano reported that more than 30,000 prosecutions had occurred under Operation
Streamline from April 1, 2010, to March 31, 2011. Secretary Janet Napolitano, Before the Senate
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs: “Securing the Border: Progress at the
Federal Level”, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (May 4, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/
ynews/testimony/testimony_1304459606805.shtm [hereinafter Napolitano Testimony].
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (indicating that a misdemeanor illegal entry carries a six-month
maximum sentence); id. § 1326 (indicating that a felony reentry can carry a two-year maximum
penalty or up to a twenty-year maximum if the migrant has a criminal record).
40. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., supra note 2.
41. LYDGATE, supra note 38, at 12 (“Despite their best efforts, it is extremely difficult for
border jurisdictions to implement Operation Streamline without depriving migrants of procedural
due process and effective assistance of counsel.”); Ted Robbins, Claims of Border Program
Success Are Unproven, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=129827870.
42. 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
43. Id. at 693–94; see also United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, No. 10-10230, slip op. at 3 (9th
Cir. May 23, 2011) (distinguishing Roblero-Solis and its discussion of a violation of Rule 11 from
a constitutional violation of due process).
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physical presence in the United States. This, Nazarian argues, would
better ensure that unlawful border entrants, if they are tried as
criminal defendants, receive the same constitutional due process
guarantees that apply to citizen criminal defendants. Anything less,
Nazarian believes, would contribute to the deterioration of rights for
all.
Beyond the border, the government’s interior immigration
enforcement strategy focuses on preventing unlawful presence44 and
removing immigration violators.45 As discussed above, these efforts
have been concentrated on partnerships with local and state law
enforcement through programs such as Secure Communities46 and
287(g).47 The workplace also continues
n
to be a central aspect of the
current administration’s interior immigration enforcement strategy,48
with a focus on employer audits.49
Workplace immigration enforcement first became official policy
in 1986 with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA),50 which Congress aimed at curbing unlawful migration by

44. In the agency’s first overall strategic plan, ICE noted that one of its primary objectives is
to prevent unlawful presence by creating a culture of employer compliance with immigration
related employment laws. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ICE STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2014, at 5–6 (2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/strategic-plan/strategic-plan-2010.pdf.
45. Id. at 6–7 (noting that key objectives of the agency include removing criminals, gang
members, and aliens who overstay visas, and achieving efficiency in the removal process).
46. Secure Communities, supra note 6.
47. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/
library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited July 17, 2011).
48. Memorandum from Marcy M. Forman, Dir., Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration
& Customs Enforcement, to Assistant Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Worksite
Enforcement Strategy 2 (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/
dro_policy_memos/worksite_enforcement_strategy4_30_2009.pdf (“The criminal prosecution of
employers is a priority [for] worksite enforcement . . . and interior enforcement [of immigration
laws].” (footnote omitted)).
49. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 44, at 6 (noting that the
agency plans to improve its auditing program and hire more auditors); Napolitano Testimony,
supra note 38 (“Since January 2009, ICE has audited more than 4,600 employers suspected of
employing unauthorized workers, debarred more than 315 companies and individuals, and
imposed approximately $59 million in financial sanctions—more than the total amount of audits
and debarments during the entire previous administration.”).
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). Hiring workers not authorized to work in the United States was
not illegal until IRCA passed in 1986. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892–93
(1984).
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deterring the employment of undocumented immigrants.51 IRCA
requires employers to screen their employees for work
authorization52 and sanctions employers who knowingly hire
undocumented immigrants.53 Twenty-five years later, IRCA’s
objectives have not been achieved. IRCA has failed to limit an
increasing undocumented population, and, even more disconcerting,
some unscrupulous employers have misused their IRCA-conferred
immigration screening power to threaten to deport undocumented
workers who refuse to comply with exploitive working conditions.54
Joseph Layne, in his article, Fighting a Losing Battle: IRCA’s
Negative Impact on Law-Abiding Employers, builds on this
unintended consequence to further argue that in addition to
facilitating the abuse of undocumented workers, IRCA also hurts
employers who desire to follow the law. Examining an
underexplored area in the immigrant workers’ rights scholarship,
Layne focuses on the role of law-abiding employers under the
current workplace immigration enforcement regime. Analyzing postIRCA judicial developments that reinforce the primacy of
immigration enforcement objectives over workplace protections,55
Layne finds that employers who strictly adhere to employment and
labor laws are at a serious market disadvantage as compared to
unscrupulous employers, who are ironically empowered by IRCA to
abscond labor laws and exploit workers who lack legal immigration
status.
Our country’s system of border and interior immigration
enforcement, which is outlined above, is accompanied by an
elaborate detention scheme. Immigrants who have allegedly violated
immigration laws and are facing removal proceedings are held in

51. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (citing INS v.
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991)) (stating that the IRCA
makes “combating the employment of illegal aliens central to ‘[t]he policy of immigration law’”).
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).
53. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (civil fines); id. § 1324a(f)(1) (criminal prosecution for employers
who engage in a pattern practice of violations).
54. REBECCA SMITH ET AL., ICED OUT: HOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT HAS
INTERFERED WITH WORKERS’ RIGHTS (2009), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/
75a43e6ae48f67216a_w2m6bp1ak.pdf; Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (2009); Michael J. Wishnie, The Border Crossed Us: Current
Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389 (2004).
55. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147.
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detention facilities, sometimes indefinitely.56 Theoretically,
immigrant detention does not constitute punishment for a crime. Yet
in practice, detained immigrants experience the loss of freedom
similar to that in penal incarceration.57 Some argue that the
guidelines and conditions of immigrant detention violate basic rights
such as access to medical treatment58 and due process.59 Due to
Congress’ plenary power over immigration policy, however,
immigration issues receive only limited constitutional judicial
review.60
Whitney Chelgren, in her article, Preventive Detention
Distorted: Why It Is Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants Without
Procedural Protections, undertakes the doctrinal and normative
complexities of a dichotomous immigrant detention system, which is
civil in theory yet penal in character. Chelgren illustrates the
humanitarian and doctrinal problems that current immigrant
detention practices raise, including harsh conditions of confinement,
unreasonable durations of detention, and other violations of due
process. Recognizing the normative premise on which immigrant
detention was founded—that of prevention of flight rather than
punishment for a crime—Chelgren concentrates her analysis on the

56. Antonio Ginatta, The Danger of Indefinite Detention, THE HILL (June 1, 2011, 4:21 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/164257-the-danger-of-indefinite-detention (“The
House Judiciary committee plans on Thursday to move forward a bill to create a system of
indefinite detention for immigrants in the United States.”).
57. SCHRIRO, supra note 8, at 21–25 (discussing the conditions of detention facilities while
noting that the majority were built as jails and prisons and that many immigrants are detained in
currently functional jails and prisons with pretrial and convicted inmates).
58. SUNITA PATEL & TOM JAWETZ, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION
DETENTION FACILITIES 3 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/unsr_ briefing_
materials.pdf (“Among the most common complaint [sic] from detainees across the country is
inadequate access to medical care.”); Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and
Mental Health Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United States, 7
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 693 (2009).
59. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 633 (2010) (stating that categories of mandatory detention are
vague and that the detention system is “too unfair, inefficient, and expensive to be sustainable”);
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 139–44.
60. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (finding that while the political branches
have plenary power over immigration, that power is “subject to important constitutional
limitations”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2002) (predicting that the plenary power doctrine
will continue to be a limit on judicial review of immigration laws); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 925, 926 (1995).
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constitutionality of practices at the pre-removal stage of immigrant
detention. Drawing parallels with pretrial detention in the criminal
justice system, Chelgren finds a complete absence of due process
safeguards for immigrants in pre-removal detention, most
importantly, a lack of individualized hearings. These constitutional
violations prompt Chelgren to recommend an overhaul of the current
detention system, which would adopt softer alternatives, such as
supervised in-home detention, to better reflect the civil rather than
penal theoretical foundation of immigrant detention.
Among those immigrants detained and subject to removal for
unlawful presence or other immigration violations, some may make a
claim for relief from removal. Such claims are adjudicated by the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within
the Department of Justice that operates as the nation’s immigration
court system.61 EOIR judges conduct civil removal proceedings.62 In
a typical removal proceeding, the immigration judge determines
whether an individual from a foreign country should be allowed to
enter or remain in the United States or be removed.63 Immigration
judges may also grant asylum, cancellation of removal, adjustment of
status, or other forms of relief.64 The immigration court is an
administrative agency rather than an independent judiciary, and
immigration judges are employees of the Department of Justice
rather than federally appointed Article III judges.65
Widespread agreement exists among judges, practitioners,
immigrants, and advocates that the current immigration court system
does not have the capacity to ensure the protection of due process
rights.66 Immigration judges have been characterized as lacking

61. 8 C.F.R § 1003.0 (2011).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006).
63. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1, 1003.10.
64. Id. § 1240.11(a), (c).
65. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4).
66. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]djudication of these
[immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal
justice.”); Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 467, 492–93 (2008) (listing federal court decisions that criticize the current
immigration court system, and citing anecdotal evidence of impartiality from practitioners);
Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1639 (2010)
(noting that the immigration adjudication system has been criticized by both political parties for
decades as being unfair, inaccurate, inconsistent, and inefficient).
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impartiality.67 Removal proceedings are considered noncriminal and
immigrants are therefore not provided with court-appointed
counsel.68 Poor translation capacity and cultural differences have had
the consequence of depriving immigrants of knowledge of their
rights.69 Finally, increased immigration enforcement has led to an
overload of immigration court cases.70 Many cases are then appealed
up to the U.S. courts of appeals, overburdening the federal appellate
court system.71
Christen Chapman critically responds to the broken immigration
court system in Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle.
Chapman’s investigation into the current state of the immigration
courts reveals a system that is corrupted by its increasingly
adversarial approach to resolving immigration matters. Chapman
notes that immigration courts have failed to implement the due
process safeguards necessary for adversarial proceedings.
Immigration proceedings, particularly adjudications for asylum or
relief from removal, are dominated by the enforcement priorities of
the ICE attorney. Noncitizen respondents are then deprived of the
opportunity to effectively present the merits of their cases, frequently
resulting in denials of relief. Chapman suggests an innovative

67. CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, PENN STATE LAW, PLAYING POLITICS AT THE BENCH:
A WHITE PAPER ON THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S INVESTIGATION INTO THE HIRING PRACTICES
OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES 57 (2009), available at http://law.psu.edu/_file/Playing%
20Politics%20at%20the%20Bench%20101209.pdf (stating that the politicized hiring of
unqualified immigration judges threatens necessary impartiality); Benedetto, supra note 66.
68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (providing the right to counsel in removal proceedings, but not at
the government’s expense); OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/
statspub/fy10syb.pdf (showing that in 2010, aliens were not represented by legal counsel in 57
percent of removal proceedings).
69. See Donna Ackermann, A Matter of Interpretation: How the Language Barrier and the
Trend of Criminalizing Illegal Immigration Caused a Deprivation of Due Process Following the
Agriprocessors, Inc. Raids, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 363 (2010).
70. See New Judge Hiring Fails to Stem Rising Immigration Case Backlog,
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), SYRACUSE UNIV. (June 7, 2011),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/250/.
71. Legomsky, supra note 66, at 1646–47 (estimating a 30 percent appeal rate from the
Board of Immigration Appeals to federal courts of appeals in fiscal year 2008, which has “created
a now well-documented crisis for the federal courts”); Judicial Emergency Declared in District of
Arizona, U.S. COURTS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-0125/Judicial_Emergency_Declared_in_District_of_Arizona.aspx (“The federal court in Arizona
has the third highest criminal caseload among the nation’s 94 federal trial courts, driven by illegal
immigration and drug smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border. Criminal cases in that court
have increased 65 percent since 2008.”).
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proposal—that immigration courts move away from an adversarial
system and toward a framework of inquisitorial adjudications. Such a
system would eliminate the ICE attorney and place full fact-finding
and adjudicatory power in the hands of the immigration judge, who
would optimally balance the goals of immigration enforcement
against the humanitarian interests of granting immigration relief to
the noncitizen respondent. Chapman contends that an inquisitorial
immigration court would achieve greater fairness and impartiality,
and ensure that the noncitizen’s due process rights are properly
protected.
In sum, the five articles in this issue provide doctrinally
comprehensive and normatively nuanced examinations of several
key aspects of comprehensive immigration reform. Each article is
also prescriptive, presenting theoretically unique yet practical,
alternatives to current dilemmas in immigration law. These
recommendations include the following:
• family-based immigration avenues should incorporate
marriage equality for same-sex binational couples;
• unauthorized border entrants who undergo criminal
prosecution should receive the due process protections
that criminal defendants receive;
• workplace immigration enforcement policies and
practices must not only prevent the exploitability of
undocumented workers but should also protect lawabiding employers;
• immigrant detention requires softer alternatives to reflect
its civil and preventative objectives; and
• immigration courts ought to move away from an
adversarial system and toward an inquisitorial system to
better ensure fairness and impartiality in adjudications.
As discussions of comprehensive immigration reform continue
among lawyers, policymakers, scholars, and advocates, the
contributions of these five articles will facilitate the development of
immigration reform measures that reflect principles of immigrant
inclusion, equality, and democracy for all.
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